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Introduction
As with many data-driven research experiments, this one was conducted 
without formulating any research questions prior to the analysis. Those 
have appeared at a later stage and constituted a departure point for 
the discussion on the usefulness of text mining techniques for the in-
terpretation of bureaucratic documents as well as allowing for the iden-
tification of several issues which have been either overlooked (e.g. 
highlighting the importance of research) or underestimated (e.g. the 
concept of sustainability or the role of human rights). Nonetheless, the 
lexical analysis confirmed many previous findings, such as the ambition 
to strengthen defence capabilities within the EU as well as the central 
role of the concept of resilience. Hence, this study claims that text min-
ing techniques can supplement traditional means of interpretation, es-
pecially when the volume and granularity of the document(s) result in 
incoherent interpretations and, as a consequence, hinder the process of 
its operationalization. Another added value of this study is the introduc-
tion of complex systems theory for the interpretation of the EUGS leit-
motif, namely the concept of resilience. The textual analysis has shown 
that the lexical layer of the recent strategy is distinctive for studies that 
build upon systems theory, regardless of the scientific discipline. This 
refers to such terms as resilience, sustainability or cooperation, which 
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are indeed a bridge between the textual and the conceptual levels of un-
derstanding the document. Thus, the latter part of this paper introduces 
complex systems theory to the interpretation of the concept of resilience 
which, although named as a leitmotif of the strategy of 2016, raises 
doubts over its factual meaning and, as a consequence, over its useful-
ness for EU policymakers. Particular emphasis have been put on the in-
terplay between the concepts of resilience and human rights, which are 
on the agenda of both the EU and the UN.
Methods
This paper proposes the application of an automated lexical analysis 
using Statistica software (StatSoft v. 13).1 Lexical analysis is one of 
the text mining techniques aimed at the extraction of meaningful infor-
mation from natural language texts. Text mining, which is a response 
to the problem of large amounts of textual data, has been already rec-
ognized as a useful tool for policymakers by the various EU institu-
tions.2 Although text mining techniques are usually applied to the large 
amounts of data, they may provide an insightful contribution to the anal-
ysis of single documents as well, as this paper aims to prove. Moreover, 
they allow for drawing evidence-based conclusions while keeping them 
brief and, thus, may serve as a handy resource for policymakers. Lastly, 
text mining allows for pointing out the similarities and differences be-
tween the relevant documents and emphasizes shifts or trends reflected 
in the language.
This study is based on a lexical analysis of the EU’s security strate-
gies: the EU Security Strategy of 2003 and the EU Global Strategy 2016 
(hereafter: EUGS). The lexical analysis included calculating term fre-
quency (measuring how frequently a term occurs in each document sep-
1 TIBCO Statistica, <http://statistica.io/>.
2 The European Commission’s Science and Knowledge Service, Competence Centre on Text 
Mining and Analysis, <https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/text-mining-and-analysis>.
Mining the EU Global Strategy… | 209 
arately) as well as inverse term frequency (measuring the importance of 
the term in a collection of documents; also known as TF-IDF). The latter 
may often give more meaningful results than a classical term frequency 
analysis.3 All the stop words (e.g. a, an, the, on) were excluded from 
the research. Both texts have been cleaned, e.g. by removing repeated 
paragraphs and headers. The analysis was conducted before and after 
applying lemmatization (thus, the results are presented in two separate 
tables).
Results
Text mining analysis allowed the creation of two separate term-docu-
ment matrices describing term frequency in each document, and a joint 
matrix measuring inverse term frequency in both documents. Based on 
all three matrices, the most significant terms have been selected and pre-
sented in Table 1 (the list of terms after applying the lemmatization of 
words) and Table 2 (the list of terms without applying lemmatization). 
The terms were selected according to three criteria: 1) high term frequen-
cy in at least one of the documents, 2) high TF-IDF score, and 3) signifi-
cance for the topic of EU defence and security policy. The terms have 
been listed in alphabetical order. When interpreting the results, it is im-
portant to keep in mind that the EU Global Strategy of 2016 contains 
about three times more words than its predecessor (15,496 compared to 
4,197 words). Hence, there are relatively large differences in the overall 
number of mentions.
3 G. Salton, M.J. MacGill, Introduction to Modern Information Retrieval, McGraw-Hill 1983, 
p. 63; J. Ramos, Using TF-IDF to Determine Word Relevance in Document Queries, 1999.
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Table 1.  List of the 10 most relevant terms (after applying lemmatization of words) 
showing the differences in the lexical layers between the EU’s security strate-
gies of 2003 and 2016. Words were extracted based on the frequency rank and 
TF-IDF score. Source: the author’s own elaboration.
Term
Strategy of 2003 Strategy of 2016
Rank Term Freq. TF-IDF Rank
Term 
Freq. TF-IDF
cooper (e.g. cooperation) 48 8 – 5 74 –
cyber – – – 74 21 2,73
deal 32 12 – 493 3 –
defen (e.g. defence) 40 9 – 15 51 –
democra (e.g. democracy) 97 5 – 74 21 –
diploma (e.g. diplomacy) – – – 47 27 2,90
econom (e.g. economy) 58 7 – 23 42 2,29
object (e.g. objective) 57 7 2,04 – 0 –
principle (e.g. principles) – – – 46 28 3,00
resili (e.g. resilience) – – – 36 35 3,16
Table 2.  List of the 22 most relevant terms (without applying lemmatization) showing 
the differences in the lexical layers between the EU’s security strategies of 
2003 and 2016. Words were extracted based on the frequency rank and TF-
IDF score. Source: the author’s own elaboration.
Term
Strategy of 2003 Strategy of 2016
Rank Term Freq. TF-IDF Rank
Term 
Freq. TF-IDF
can 10 17 – 19 37 –
climate – – – 42 24 2,90
conflict 8 19 – 42 24 –
conflicts 35 9 – 43 23 –
counter-terrorism – – – 133 11 2,36
crisis 29 10 – 153 10 –
crises 371 1 – 61 20 –
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Term
Strategy of 2003 Strategy of 2016
Rank Term Freq. TF-IDF Rank
Term 
Freq. TF-IDF
development 29 10 – 11 55 –
distant 110 4 1,65 – – –
energy 74 5 – 18 39
human rights 221 2 – 38 26 –
Member States 51 6 – 13 44 –
migration – – – 53 22 2,84
must 221 2 – 7 65 –
problems 16 14 2,52 – 0 –
research – – – 133 11 2,36
security 2 31 – 3 128 –
should 8 19 – 121 12 –
sustainable – – – 26 31 3,07
threat 29 10 – 336 5 –
threats 5 24 – 121 12 –
will 15 15 – 1 274 –
Discussion 
Tone: ‘Yes, We Can’ or ‘We Must’?
There were few comparative lexical studies touching on the differ-
ences between the current and previous EU strategies in the areas of 
defence and security. Yet even a cursory analysis of both documents 
highlights striking differences in their lexical layers. The introduction 
to the strategy of 2003 starts with the statement that “Europe has never 
been so prosperous, so secure nor so free”4 and such a conviction – that 
Europe is doing well – was reflected in the language used in the docu-
4 Council of the European Union, European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better 
World, Brussels, 2003, p. 2.
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ment. One may say the tone was enthusiastic, as the strategy called for 
being “more active in pursuing our strategic objectives”5 and concluded 
that “[t]his is a world of new dangers but also of new opportunities.”6 
The most frequently occurring verbs were: should (8th most frequently 
mentioned word), can (10th) and will (15th). These are used to express 
recommendation (should), underline capacity (can), and set an objec-
tive7 or express future action (will). Significantly, none of them express-
es necessity. The latter, associated with the word must, remained almost 
absent as it was used only twice in the document (221st). 
The situation with the EUGS is quite the opposite. While the most 
frequently used word in the whole document is will, the word must was 
ranked 7th (and, simultaneously, the second most common verb). At the 
same time, the frequency of the verbs can and should decreased sig-
nificantly (to 19th and 121st respectively). This striking inversion of 
proportions confirms that the current strategy is not limited to the identi-
fication of possible objectives but underlines the necessity and urgency 
in addressing threats. The overall tone of the EUGS is far more pes-
simistic – suffice it to cite the opening sentence: “The purpose, even 
existence, of our Union is being questioned.”8
Similarly, the analysis of lexical layers reflects different scale of the 
challenges that the EU was tackling in 2003 and is facing now. Under 
the previous strategy, the most frequent terms used to describe chal-
lenges were threats (5th most frequently occurred in the document) and 
problems (16th). The former implies rather the possibility than the ac-
tual existence of dangerous occurrence. The latter clearly refers to the 
present situations regarded as unwelcome, however remains a relatively 
soft expression and, most of all, suggests that the difficulties are pos-
5 Ibidem, 11. 
6 Ibidem, 14.
7 Interestingly, the term ‘objective(s)’, while being present in the Strategy of 2003, is absent 
in the EUGS. Therefore, this term has been indicated as a relevant for the Strategy of 2003 
with the TF-IDF score (2,04).
8 Council of the European Union, European Security Strategy, 14.
Mining the EU Global Strategy… | 213 
sible to overcome. The EUGS, on the other hand, operates mostly with 
the terms conflicts (23 mentions) and crises (20 mentions)9, while prob-
lems does not appear even once, and the frequency of threats significant-
ly decreased (12 mentions). Hence, the rhetoric of the EUGS is much 
tougher and corresponds with the urgency emphasized in the previous 
part of this study. Moreover, the EUGS operates mostly with the plural 
forms (crises, conflicts) while under the strategy of 2003 singular forms 
of these words clearly prevailed (crisis, conflict).
Furthermore, the EUGS emphasizes the global character of chal-
lenges and the need for internal cooperation (between the Member 
States) and external cooperation (notably with the United States, United 
Nations, and NATO) when tackling them. Under the previous strate-
gy, the issue of cooperation was marginalized and limited to external 
relations only. Its revival is arguably a consequence of diagnosing the 
interdependence of internal and external threats, the need for greater co-
herence between the policies of the EU and Member States10, as well as 
the belief that none of the EU countries is able to address current threats 
alone.11 Moreover, the principle of cooperation is frequently mentioned 
in the context of building military capabilities, which constitutes an-
other distinctive feature of the EUGS.
Many scholars and experts have pointed out that the EUGS empha-
sized building the military capacities of the EU.12 Indeed, the lexical 
analysis supports this assessment – the frequency of the word defence 
(or defend) increased significantly from 9 (which gave it 40th posi-
tion on the rank list) to 51 (15th), while the frequency of the word se-
curity decreased slightly (from 2nd in 2003 to 3rd position in 2016). 
Furthermore, the document stresses the importance of cooperation in 
9 See for instance subsection 3.3 of the EUGS.
10 Council of the European Union, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Glob-
al Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy, Brussels 2016, p. 30.
11 Ibidem, p. 3.
12 J. Legrand, Does the New EU Global Strategy Deliver on Security and Defence?, 2016, 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/570472/EXPO_IDA 
(2016)570472_EN.pdf.>
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the context of building defense capabilities – cooperative effort should 
contribute to achieving interoperability, effectiveness, the ability to act 
autonomously and, therefore, to build the credibility of the EU. All in 
all, cooperation (and its inflected forms) is the 5th most frequently used 
word (74 mentions) and predominantly appears in the context of de-
fense.13 At the same time, the term was almost absent under the previ-
ous strategy (8 mentions). The cooperation framework refers as much 
to the Member States as to other partners, notably the United States, 
UN, NATO as well as neighbouring countries. 
Regarding internal cooperation, the EUGS proposes an exploration 
of opportunities for enhanced cooperation with a view to establishing 
a structured form of cooperation in the future.14 Although not directly 
mentioned, this clearly refers to the Permanent Structured Cooperation 
(PESCO) foreseen in articles 42.6 and 46 TEU.15 The European Council 
emphasized on several occasions that “any capabilities developed through 
PESCO will remain owned and operated by the Member States”16 and 
reminded that the cooperation within PESCO has to be consistent with 
the commitments agreed within NATO and the UN. In December 2017 
13 Member States remain sovereign in their defence decisions: nevertheless, to acquire and 
maintain many of these capabilities, defence cooperation must become the norm. The EU 
will systematically encourage defence cooperation and strive to create a solid European de-
fence industry, which is critical for Europe’s autonomy of decision and action. See Council of 
the European Union, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy 
for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy, p. 11. Europeans must be able to 
protect Europe, respond to external crises, and assist in developing our partners’ security and 
defence capacities, carrying out these tasks in cooperation with others. See ibidem, p. 19. 
While defence policy and spending remain national prerogatives, no Member State can afford 
to do this individually: this requires a concerted and cooperative effort. See ibidem, p. 20.
14 Defence cooperation between Member States will be systematically encouraged. See ibi-
dem, p. 46. If successful and repeated over time, this might lead to a more structured form 
of cooperation, making full use of the Lisbon Treaty’s potential. See ibidem, p. 48.
15 Council of the European Union, European Council Conclusions on Security and Defence, 
22 June 2017, para. 8, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/06/22/
euco-security-defence/>. 
16 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Implementing the EU Global 
Strategy in the Area of Security and Defence, 6 March 2017, para. 6, <http://www.con-
silium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/06/conclusions-security-defence/>.
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Council of the European Union adopted a decision establishing PESCO 
and determining the list of participating Member States.17 In the joint 
declaration, Member States expressed their intention to collaborate on 
17 initial projects.18 
Within the defence cooperation framework, the EUGS emphasizes 
the role of research and technology (R&T)19 – something that was entirely 
absent under the strategy of 2003.20 Call for the development of R&T in 
the area of defence was further operationalized in the European Defence 
Action Plan adopted in 2016.21 Finally, this was reflected in the Council 
decision establishing PESCO (14866/17), in which Member States com-
mitted inter alia to increase “the share of expenditure allocated to de-
fence R&T with a view to nearing the 2% of total defence spending.”22 
Thus, it should be not surprising that the European Commission plans 
to spend €500 million a year on defence R&T, starting from 2021.23 Nor 
should it be if the EU launches a fully-fledged European Defence Research 
Programme 2021–2017 with a budget as high as €3.5 billion.24
Emphasis on cooperation between all the stakeholders rather than 
centralization when building the defense capabilities of the EU corre-
17 Council of the European Union, Shared Vision, Common Action, p. 11.
18 Declaration on PESCO projects, available: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/32020/
draft-pesco-declaration-clean-10122017.pdf>. For the brief description of the projects see 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/32079/pesco-overview-of-first-collaborative-of-
projects-for-press.pdf>.
19 Crucially, EU funding for defence research and technology (…) will prove instrumental in 
developing the defence capabilities Europe needs. A sustainable, innovative and competi-
tive European defence industry is essential for Europe’s strategic autonomy and for a cred-
ible CSDP. See Council of the European Union, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger 
Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy, 2016, p. 46.
20 There was no mention of research in the strategy of 2003, while the term appeared 11 times 
under the EUGS. Hence, the TF-IDF score for the term is relatively high (2,36).
21 Council of the European Union 2016, op. cit, p. 19.
22 Ibidem. See Annex II, par. 4.
23 J. Mawdsley, The Emergence of the European Defence Research Programme, in: The 
Emergence of EU Defense Research Policy. Innovation, Technology, and Knowledge Man-
agement, eds N. Karampekios, I. Oikonomou, E. Carayannis, Washington 2018, p. 209.
24 D. Fiott, EU Defence Research in Development, “European Union Institute for Security 
Studies” 2016, no. 1.
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sponds closely with the conceptual framework for resilience. Scholars 
researching complex systems25 point out that decentralized and non-hi-
erarchical structures are more resilient to potential attacks.26 The resil-
ience of a network structure increases with the number of connections 
between the nodes27 (in the context of the EUGS – between Member 
States and their neighbourhood) and allows for avoiding situations such 
as when an attack on the best-connected node (for instance, a cyberat-
tack on the EU institutions) affects the functionality of the whole system.
The inherent complexity of resilience and its role in building 
sustainability
The meaning of the term resilience28 in the EUGS was a subject of 
numerous discussions – many studies emphasized its ambiguity or vague-
ness29 and called for its refinement.30 Nevertheless, the concept of resil-
25 As a discipline, complex systems is a new field of science studying how parts of a system 
and their relationships give rise to the collective behaviors of the system, and how the sys-
tem interrelates with its environment. See the definition: Y. Bar-Yam, General Features of 
Complex Systems, in: Knowledge Management, Organizational Intelligence and Learning, 
and Complexity, ed. L.D. Kiel, vol. I, Oxford 2009, p. 354.
26 A. Reka, J. Hawoong, A. Barabasi, Error and Attack Tolerance of Complex Networks, “Na-
ture” 2000, no. 409, pp. 378–382.
27 Consequently, resilience is governed by three topological characteristics, where dense, 
symmetric and heterogeneous networks are most resilient, and sparse, antisymmetric and 
heterogeneous networks are least resilient. See J. Gao, B. Barzel, B. Barabási, Universal 
Resilience Patterns in Complex Networks, “Nature” 2016, no. 530, pp. 307–312.
28 The term “resilience” was coined by the ecologist C.S. Holling as early as in 1973 and 
was then defined as “a measure of the persistence of systems and of their ability to absorb 
change and disturbance and still maintain the same relationships between populations or 
state variables”. See Crawford Stanley Holling, Resilience and Stability of Ecological Sys-
tems, Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 4, no. 1 (November 1973), p. 14, https://
doi.org/10.1146/annurev.es.04.110173.000245. Some scholars underline that the concept of 
resilience has been developed simultaneously in the fields of ecology, psychology (mainly 
child development and children’s ability to recover from trauma) and epidemiology (abil-
ity to sustain health). See M. Welsh, Resilience and Responsibility: Governing Uncertainty 
in a Complex World, “The Geographical Journal” 2014, no. 1, pp. 15–26. The concept of 
resilience subsequently expanded to the social and economic systems. See Council of the 
European Union 2016, op. cit., p. 11.
29 A.E. Juncos, Resilience as the New EU Foreign Policy Paradigm: A Pragmatist Turn?, 
“European Security” 2017, no. 1(26), p. 3.
30 C. Altafin, V. Haász, K. Podstawa, The New Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Se-
curity Policy at a Time of Human Rights Crises, “Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights” 
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ience is nothing new in EU rhetoric, and its frequency in various EU docu-
ments has been increasing rapidly since 2009. According to the EUR-Lex 
(the most complex database covering EU documents), the term resilience 
was mentioned in 128 documents in 2009. This number increased to 320 
in the year preceding the adoption of the EUGS. In the last two years, 
the growing tendency significantly strengthened (581 documents in 2017) 
and this increase was arguably prompted by the new strategy. Neverthe-
less, the EUGS should be interpreted not as a stand-alone document but 
as a consequence of a long-term trend. Moreover, the concept of resilience 
was steadily spreading not only into the EU rhetoric – this tendency re-
flected a global increase in the popularity of this term31; the concept has 
also been previously introduced to the security strategies of various Mem-
ber States, e.g. France (2013), United Kingdom (2015), Germany (2016). 
Any attempt to understand the concept of resilience will, inevitably, 
lead to systems theory (and, most of all, to complex systems theory). 
Although the EUGS does not explicitly propose the application of sys-
tems theory to security and defense, it refers to states and societies – and 
both are nothing other than highly sophisticated systems with individu-
als, communities, political institutions, economies, environmental and 
energy resources as their components. In other words, both are complex 
systems. Moreover, various EU documents and instructions refer to the 
OECD’s studies32, which expressis verbis propose a systems approach 
and introduce “resilience systems analysis“ as a tool for policymakers.33
A complex systems approach focuses on “how parts of a system and 
their relationships give rise to the collective behaviors of the system, 
and how the system interrelates with its environment.”34 It seems that the 
2017, no. 2(35), p. 5.
31 According to Google N-gram Viewer, there was a gradual increase in the use of word ‘re-
silience’ in the period 1970–1990. Since 1990 the growth has been exponential.
32 See for instance: European Commission, Operating in Situations of Conflict and Fragility. 
An EU Staff Handbook, Brussels/Luxembourg, 2015. See also: Council of the European 
Union 2016, op. cit., p. 20.
33 OECD, Guidelines for Resilience Systems Analysis – Facilitation Guide, 2014, p. 5.
34 Yaneer Bar-Yam, General Features…
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EUGS is underpinned with a similar logic – it underlines the role of the 
Member States (parts of the system) and the cooperation between them 
(the relationships) as a precondition for building a resilient EU (the col-
lective behavior of the system) and emphasizes the nexus between the 
external and internal threats (how the system interrelates with its environ-
ment). If we find the theory of complex systems to be applicable to the 
EUGS, we can justify, for instance, the multidimensionality of resilience. 
As Lance H. Gunderson and C.S. Holling propose, the complexity of the 
challenges to the specific system requires analysis of interactions among 
three to five sets of variables, each operating at a qualitatively distinct 
speed.35 Reducing sets of variables to two, however convenient for the 
analysis, misses the complexity of interactions and interdependencies be-
tween the various variables. Therefore, simplification may lead to an inad-
equate understanding of the emerging challenges and, as a consequence, 
to wrongfully designed policies. Thus, the concept of resilience, if we 
agree on the relevance of the complex systems approach, has to be mul-
tidimensional. This conclusion, in consequence, invalidates arguments 
stressing the ambiguity or vagueness of the concept of resilience.
Furthermore, complex systems theory may shed a new light on 
the nexus between resilience and sustainability. Although resilience 
has been named as the leitmotif of the EUGS36, the lexical analysis re-
veals that the frequency of the term sustainable increased identically 
(and, respectively, its TF-IDF score). While the previous strategy did not 
mention it even once, the term appeared 31 times in the EUGS. More-
over, the document suggests a close relationship between resilience and 
sustainable development, stating that: “[a] resilient society featuring de-
mocracy, trust in institutions, and sustainable development lies at the 
35 L.H. Gunderson and C.S. Holling, Panarchy : Understanding Transformations in Human 
and Natural Systems, Washington 2002, pp. 69–71.
36 M. Sanders, Obama’s Principled Pragmatism, Contemporary Pragmatism 8, no. 2 (April 
2011), pp. 31–42.
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heart of a resilient state.”37 This is neither a coincidence nor a surprise, 
since the linkages between the two concepts have been the subject of 
numerous studies38 touching upon various fields (e.g. environment39, 
economy40, emergency management41). The relation between these two 
concepts has been the subject of numerous theoretical considerations42, 
including publications building on the theory of complex systems.43 
What may be beneficial for the EU policymakers from these discussions 
is the fundamental difference between both concepts – while building 
sustainability needs to have a specific long-term goal (e.g. Sustainable 
Development Goals)44, building resilience cannot have one, as the fu-
ture threats to the stability of the system are not known. Thus, resilience 
should focus on training the general ability to withstand and recover 
from shock. Interestingly, the EUGS dropped the class of strategic ob-
jectives that was used in the previous strategy and replaced it with the 
more general class of goals with an overarching goal to build a sustain-
able and resilient Union. Many studies emphasize that sustainability 
37 Council of the European Union, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – 
A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy, 2016, p. 8.
38 “Resilience theory emphasizes that change is as normal a condition for social-ecological 
systems as stability, and a system may exist in multiple stable states. The goal is to enable 
a system to respond to changing conditions so that there are minimal losses to the sys-
tem and to its essential functioning. External shocks or emergent stresses pushing the 
system over a threshold may prompt the changing condition. […] Similar to a resilience ap-
proach, sustainability analyses understand the biophysical drivers and constraints on a sys-
tem’s future, but focus on and measure change in terms of human decisions, institutional 
dynamics, and shared attitudes.” See Council of the European Union 2016, p. 46. See also: 
European Commision, European Defence Action Plan.
39 C. Altafin, V. Haász, K. Podstawa, The New Global Strategy…, p. 142.
40 Y. Bar-Yam, General Features…
41 Council of the European Union, European Security Strategy: A secure Europe in a better 
world, 2003, p. 2.
42 Ibidem, p. 11.
43 Ibidem, p. 14.
44 Interestingly, the preamble of the Agenda 2030 mentions both concepts together: We are 
determined to take the bold and transformative steps which are urgently needed to shift 
the world onto a sustainable and resilient path. See UN General Assembly, Transforming 
our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 21 October 2015, A/RES/70/1, 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/57b6e3e44.html>.
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requires resilient components such as a resilient environment, a resilient 
economy and a resilient society.45 Otherwise, development may be easi-
ly undone. As we will show further in this study, those three components 
receive the lion’s share of the EU narrative on resilience.
Case Study: Multidimensionality  
of Resilience in the EU Rhetoric at the UN Fora
As many scholars have pointed out, under the EUGS the term resilience 
appears in various contexts, which may lead to confusion over its factual 
meaning. The European Parliament has recently removed some of these 
doubts by the adoption of a resolution on resilience as a strategic priority 
of the external action of the EU.46 The resolution underlines the impor-
tance of the OECD’s resilience “systems analysis framework” (para. 3) and 
stresses its multidimensional nature: human, economic, environmental, po-
litical, security and societal (para. 4). Although these dimensions remain 
undefined, they clearly build on the OECD’s Guidelines for Resilience 
System Analysis, which applies, however, slightly different terminology. 
The OECD distinguishes the following components of system resilience: 
financial (e.g. banking facilities, employment), human (e.g. knowledge, ed-
ucation, health), natural (e.g. environment, agriculture, minerals), physical 
(e.g. energy, infrastructure), political (e.g. knowledge of rights and duties, 
political participation) and social (e.g. formal and informal social interac-
tion). While the OECD’s financial and natural components have counter-
parts in the EU’s economic and environmental dimensions, the EU’s ele-
ment of security seems to be broader than the OECD’s physical component. 
The OECD’s physical component emphasizes the resilience of the mate-
rial infrastructure and does not mention the resilience of cyberspace at all. 
The EU’s security dimension, on the other hand, stresses the importance 
45 M. Welsh, Resilience and Responsibility: Governing Uncertainty in a Complex World, 
“The Geographical Journal” 2014, no. 1.
46 European Parliament resolution of 1 June 2017 on resilience as a strategic priority of the ex-
ternal action of the EU (2017/2594(RSP)).
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of cyber resilience, which encompasses both critical infrastructure man-
agement as well as building the resilience of cyberspace (against e.g. cy-
ber espionage or propaganda). In order to investigate, if the EU adheres to 
the framework outlined above, we examined the 
EU’s Activity in the United Nations  
Between July 2014 and December 2019
So far, the adoption of resilience as the strategic priority under the 
EUGS, was indeed reflected in the EU interventions47 at the United Na-
tions, but only for a short period of time following the adoption of the 
strategy (Table 3). The term appeared in the 20 out of 69 EU statements 
(29%) made between January and June 2017, while in the preceding two 
years the frequency did not exceed 14%. Nevertheless, since July 2017 
a share of interventions mentioning resilience drastically decreased and 
varied between 8.9% (July-December 2017) and 13.5% (January-June 
2019). One explanation is that the period following launching the EUGS 
was accompanied by general excitement with a new strategy, and thus 
its leitmotif was perhaps overused. In this light, the subsequent decrease 
in the second half of 2017 may be the result of the realization that over-
exploitation may degrade resilience to the point where it becomes mere-
ly a buzzword rather than a guiding principle.
The analysis of the EU’s rhetoric at the UN leads to the conclu-
sion that the multidimensional nature of resilience needs to be further 
clarified, particularly in the areas of strengthening the security of critical 
infrastructure and cyberspace as well as the political fabric of society. 
The concept of resilience was most frequently referred to in the contexts 
of environmental challenges (mainly climate change mitigation48 and 
47 Analysis encompassed statements made by the EU, including joint statements. All docu-
ments have been extracted from the official website of the Delegation of the European 
Union to the United Nations in New York.
48 Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations in New York, EU Statement – 
United Nations Open-ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and Law of the Sea, 
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Small Island Developing Countries49), humanitarian aid operations,50 
and the protection of vulnerable groups (mainly women51 and refugees52 
but since 2018 also young people53). Recently, more emphasis has been 
placed on the building of a resilient economy (e.g. low-emissions econ-
omy54, and a resilient labour market55). These findings correspond with 
the lists of the EU priorities for the UN General Assembly, in which re-
silience rhetoric is present primarily in the contexts of environmental 
protection, sustainable development and disaster recovery.56
15 May 2017, EUUN17–045EN. EU Intervention: United Nations – PGA expert level 
meeting on Water, 22 March 2017, EUUN17–024EN.
49 Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations in New York, EU Statement – Unit-
ed Nations 2nd Committee: Sustainable Development and UN-Habitat, 15 October 2014, 
EUUN14–153EN. EU Statement by Commissioner Piebalgs – United Nations 3rd International 
Conference on Small Island Developing States: Plenary, 1 September 2014, EUUN14–106EN.
50 Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations in New York, EU Statement – United 
Nations General Assembly: Famine Response and Prevention, 14 April 2017, EUUN17–030EN.
51 Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations in New York, EU Statement – United Na-
tions General Assembly: Global awareness of the tragedies of irregular migrants in the Mediter-
ranean basin, with specific emphasis on Syrian asylum seekers, 7 April, 2017, EUUN17–029EN.
52 Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations in New York, EU Statement – 
United Nations 3rd Committee: Report of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 2 No-
vember 2016, EUUN16–184EN.
53 Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations in New York, EU Statement – 
United Nations General Assembly: Youth and Migration, 26 February 2019.
54 Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations in New York, EU Statement – 
United Nations High-Level Meeting on Climate Change and the Sustainable Development 
Agenda, 23 March 2017, EUUN17–025EN. EU Commissioner Crețu at the Opening Ple-
nary Session of the UN Habitat Conference, 18 October 2016, EC16–1018.
55 Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations in New York, EU Statement – 
United Nations 3rd Committee: Social Development, 4 October 2016, EUUN16–118EN.
56 The list for the 71st GA mentions security (peace), the resilience of communities and gov-
ernments, humanitarian assistance; 70th GA – environmental protection, low carbon and 
resilient economy; 69th GA – community resilience to disasters and conflicts, 68th GA – re-
silience of societies and economies, climate resilient low carbon development, community 
safety and resilience to disasters and conflicts; 67th – no mentions; 66th – resilience of the 
vulnerable and fragile countries; 65th and 64th – no mentions.
57 Context labels have been assigned manually by the author after thorough review of the state-
ments that mentioned the word resilience/resilient at least once. One statement could have 
been classified into two categories if resilience was mentioned more than once and in vari-
ous contexts. If terms resilience/resilient were mentioned more than once, but in the same 
context, such a statement was classified only to one category.
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Table 3.  Presence of the term ‘resilience/resilient’ in EU statements and interventions 
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2019 (Jul-Dec) 141 16 11,3 1 4 0 3 3 1 4
2019 (Jan-Jun) 104 14 13,5 2 3 1 3 5 1 3
2018 (Jul-Dec) 121 13 10,7 1 2 0 2 3 3 3
2018 (Jan-Jun) 108 14 13,0 4 4 1 1 6 5 1
2017 (Jul-Dec) 135 12 8,9 1 4 1 1 5 1 1
2017 (Jan-Jun) 69 20 29,0 5 3 4 5 6 7 2
2016 (Jul-Dec) 131 13 9,9 3 2 2 4 2 3 2
2016 (Jan-Jun) 99 14 14,1 3 1 2 6 2 4 2
2015 (Jul-Dec) 108 13 12,0 2 1 0 7 3 2 2
2015 (Jan-Jul) 107 13 12,1 0 2 1 3 3 4 1
2014 (Jul-Dec) 134 21 15,4 0 2 1 8 3 5 3
2014 (Jan-Jun) 91 14 15,4 0 0 3 2 2 8 1
Overall 1348 177 13.1 19 21 15 39 35 42 18
What is significant for the EU’s narrative is the importance of the 
nexus between the environmental, economic and humanitarian dimen-
sions, which apparently constitute core elements of resilience building.58 
Some may say that the EU rhetoric at the UN fora is determined by 
58 Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations in New York, EU Statement – 
United Nations General Assembly: Famine Response and Prevention, 14 April 2017, 
EUUN17–030EN.
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the challenges on the UN agenda (such as the Ebola outbreak, climate 
change and the fulfillment of the SDGs) and that is why other elements 
are set aside. Nevertheless, the analysis of the EU documents on re-
silience confirms there is a strong attachment to the abovementioned 
elements. For instance, the recent European Parliament resolution on 
resilience as a strategic priority of the external action of the EU clearly 
prioritizes the humanitarian dimension and the need for empowering 
vulnerable groups, mainly women.59 The EU’s Action Plan for Resil-
ience in Crisis Prone Countries 2013–2020 is more multidimensional, 
but remains limited to the humanitarian, environmental and societal 
perspectives. The broadest approach may be found in the document en-
titled “A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU’s external action” 
adopted by the European Commission in June 2017. So far, this is the 
only document that put equal emphasis on all the elements, including 
the political60 and security dimensions.61
The Role of Principles and Values  
Under the EUGS – Where are Human Rights?
The EUGS frequently, and in various contexts, refers to principles 
(28 mentions in the EUGS, compared to zero in the previous strategy). 
The document emphasizes that the principles will guide the EU’s ex-
ternal action62, that in the promotion of shared interests, the EU will 
adhere to clear principles63 and that the EU will engage in a practical 
59 European Parliament resolution of 1 June 2017 on resilience as a strategic priority of the ex-
ternal action of the EU (2017/2594(RSP)).
60 European Commission, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: 
A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU’s external action, 7 June 2017, JOIN(2017) 
21 final, pp. 3, 7.
61 Ibidem, pp. 15–17.
62 Ibidem, 3.
63 J. Legrand, Does the New EU Global Strategy Deliver on Security and Defence?, 2016, 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/570472/EXPO_IDA 
(2016)570472_EN.pdf>.
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and principled way in peacebuilding.64 Those principles include but ar-
guably are not limited to: accountability, representativeness, responsi-
bility, effectiveness and transparency.65 Turning towards principles and 
rules – absent from the previous strategy – confirms that the EU is fac-
ing a period of high uncertainty and seeks to minimize potential turbu-
lence. Indeed, in recent years the EU did not necessarily follow formerly 
established principles, e.g. in the case of Ukraine, the EU had been con-
sistently moving away from democratic conditionality and subsequently 
abandoned it in November 2013, due to fears that the country would 
come under the Russian sphere of influence.66 Taking into consideration 
rising autocratic tendencies in neighboring countries (e.g. Turkey), as 
well as in the EU itself (e.g. Poland, Hungary), the EU’s reaffirmed 
commitment to principles, rules, and values is being put to the test.
The concept of “principled pragmatism” requires special attention. 
This proposed approach to foreign policy aims at striking a balance be-
tween realism and idealism, isolationism and interventionism.67 Although 
proposed as one of the leitmotifs of the EUGS, principled pragmatism 
is not an entirely new concept. For instance, Barack Obama adopted it 
as a guiding principle for US diplomacy.68 Even before than that, in the 
early 2000s it emerged at the intersection of international human rights 
law and business. It was originally defined by John Ruggie as “an un-
flinching commitment to the principle of strengthening the promotion 
and protection of human rights as it relates to businesses, coupled with 
64 Council of the European Union, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe - 
A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy, 2016, p. 11.
65 Ibidem, p. 19.
66 Ibidem, p. 20.
67 In charting the way between the Scylla of isolationism and the Charybdis of rash inter-
ventionism, the EU will engage the world manifesting responsibility towards others and 
sensitivity to contingency. See ibidem, p. 46.
68 Ibidem, p. 48. Paul Richard Huard, “Principled Pragmatism: Fredrik Logevall on Obama’s 
Legacy”, The National Interest, 23 May 2016, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/princi-
pled-pragmatism-fredrik-logevall-obamas-legacy-16312>. Recent National Security Strat-
egy of the United States of America, adopted in December 2017 and signed by Donald 
Trump, operates with an equivalent ‘principled realism’. 
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a pragmatic attachment to what works best in creating change where it 
matters most — in the daily lives of people.”69 The EUGS does not offer 
its own definition, limiting itself to the vague remark that principle prag-
matism “stems as much from a realistic assessment of the strategic en-
vironment as from an idealistic aspiration to advance a better world.”70 
Thus, principled pragmatism may be interpreted per analogiam as the 
concept that integrates the need for the protection of values (idealistic 
dimension) and common sense in choosing the means to achieve the 
goal (realistic dimension).
John Ruggie, as well as the Obama administration (most notably 
Hilary Clinton), linked principled pragmatism with one specific value, 
namely human rights.71 As the lexical analysis has shown, the same is 
the case with the EUGS – human rights are the single most frequently 
mentioned value (26 times), followed by democracy (21 mentions), and 
the rule of law (6 mentions). Interestingly, in the strategy of 2003, the 
presence of values was marginal – democracy was invoked five times, 
the rule of law three times and human rights only twice. This remarkable 
rejuvenation of human rights may indicate the way in which principled 
pragmatism will be addressed – more emphasis will be put on the pro-
tection of human rights than on building democratic institutions.
Some may invoke a historical analogy to the Helsinki Accords of 
1975, when the Western World’s pursuit of human rights jeopardized the 
decline of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the USSR. Ameri-
cans were conscious that advocating for human rights may bring bet-
ter long-term results than calling for the free elections or adopting the 
rule of law. The latter was aimed directly at the destruction of state ap-
paratus, thus the USSR would have been more resistant to engage in 
69 UN Economic and Social Council, Interim Report of the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other 
Business Enterprises, E/CN.4/2006/97, para. 81.
70 Council of the European Union, European Council Conclusions on Security and Defence, 
para. 8.
71 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Implementing the EU Global 
Strategy in the Area of Security and Defence, para. 6. 
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any constructive dialogue. Even more interestingly, L. Garment (for-
mer U.S. Representative to the United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights) perceived human rights as a tailor-made diplomatic instrument 
aimed at non-resilient states. During his hearing before the Commis-
sion on Security and Cooperation in Europe in February 1977, he em-
phasized that: “They are not prepared to yield on them. The strength 
of their society is thin, the ability to withstand crises, economic crises, 
food, crises, ultimately human rights crises, is precarious, and therefore 
they will make a real issue of our right to press for implementation of 
agreements arrived at in Helsinki.”72
The difference is that this time human rights appear not as a weapon 
against non-democratic regimes, but primarily as a remedy for the EU’s 
eroded credibility and effectiveness in approaching its neighborhood. 
Therefore, placing human rights high on the agenda is a consequence 
of the adoption of principled pragmatism and resilience as guiding 
principles for the EUGS. The interdependency of these concepts is be-
ing consistently reaffirmed in various EU documents. For instance, the 
European Parliament resolution on resilience as a strategic priority of 
the external action of the EU not only emphasizes the role of human 
rights in building resilience but stresses the need to “focus on results” in 
this matter.73 While human rights were mentioned seven times through-
out the text of the resolution, the other values (democracy and the rule 
of law) were invoked only three times in total. 
One may ask if the values of democracy and the rule of law are 
not compatible (or less compatible) with the concepts of either prin-
cipled pragmatism or resilience? Yet democracy and respect for the rule 
of law in the EU’s neighborhood undeniably serve its geopolitical in-
terests. Democratic regimes are more stable prosperous and – to use 
72 Hearings before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, ninety-fifth Con-
gress, First Session on the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, vol. I, 23–24 February 
1977, p. 12.
73 European Parliament resolution of 1 June 2017 on resilience as a strategic priority of the 
external action of the EU (2017/2594(RSP)).
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EU language – resilient than autocracies. Nevertheless, the promotion 
of democracy aspires to spark a systemic change at the level of gover-
nance, which often meets with resistance from the ruling elites. The re-
view of the European Neighborhood Policy confirms that it also requires 
a tailor-made approach with each and every country. Thus, democrati-
zation is a complex and rather evolutionary process of transformation 
that encompasses inter alia strengthening human rights and the rule of 
law. Human rights, on the other hand, are aimed primarily at the protec-
tion of individuals from arbitrary state actions. They are far better con-
ceptualized and operationalized in dozens of international human rights 
treaties and other instruments adopted since 1945. Moreover, the EU 
remains only one among many international actors that advocates for 
human rights protection. Thus, support for human rights can bring better 
results in a considerably shorter time, which closely corresponds with 
the reasons behind the adoption of the concept of resilience. The EU’s 
priority is, after all, the mitigation of fragility – both internal and ex-
ternal – and the crisis rhetoric (best exemplified by the frequency of 
occurrence of must) only confirms that the EU intensely seeks stability 
for Europe. All the abovementioned factors explain the rejuvenation of 
human rights narration under the EUGS and, at the same time, provoke 
questions over the democratic component of resilience.
Conclusions
Comparative analysis of the European Security Strategy of 2003 and the 
European Union Global Strategy of 2016 unveils significant differences 
in their lexical layers. Those differences are reflected, to some extent, in 
the subsequently adopted documents and policies. The EUGS underlines 
inter alia the necessity of developing defense capabilities, building re-
silience, and the affirmation of principled pragmatism as a guide for the 
EU’s external actions. As the following documents adopted by the Eu-
ropean Parliament (e.g. resolution on resilience as a strategic priority of 
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the external action of the EU74) and European Commission (e.g. Europe-
an Defence Action Plan75) indicate, those are not merely empty rhetoric, 
but substantive commitments that are being consistently implemented.
Nevertheless, not all of the commitments established under the EUGS 
are equally translated  nto action. On one spectrum, there is the area of 
defence, where the EU’s strong commitment is best demonstrated by 
the proposed budget allocation of €3.5 billion for the period 2021–2027. 
Furthermore, the establishment of PESCO remains in accordance 
with the affirmation of the cooperation framework highlighted under 
the EUGS. Somewhere in the middle, there is the concept of resilience, 
which is indeed frequently mentioned in numerous EU documents, but the 
recent increase may very well be a continuation of a long-term fascination 
with this concept and not the result of its inclusion in the EUGS. Indeed, 
the analysis of the EU interventions at the UN fora indicates that the con-
cept of resilience was present in the EU rhetoric in the period preceding 
its adoption (2014–2015). Although there was a sharp increase in the fre-
quency of mentions of this term in the first half of 2017, the following 
months have witnessed a significant drop. This may suggest that the EU 
still needs better operationalization of this concept. On the other end of 
the spectrum, there is principled pragmatism which itself rarely appears 
in the EU documents and rhetoric. As C. Altafin, V. Haász, and K. Pod-
stawa noticed, although human rights are present in the textual layer of the 
EUGS, their role in the European grand Strategy is not clear.76
The textual analysis of the EUGS allowed the extraction of the most 
frequent terms that together create a net of interlinked concepts (e.g. re-
silience, human rights) and phrases (e.g. cooperation, the prevalence 
of plural nouns when describing threats and problems). The theory of 
complex systems explains many of the relations between them and may 
even be more useful in the further operationalization of concepts such 
74 Ibidem.
75 Y. Bar-Yam, General Features…
76 Council of the European Union, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – 
A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy, 2016, p. 46.
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as resilience or principled pragmatism. Nevertheless, the complexity of 
the EUGS will arguably pose problems for policymakers and EU di-
plomacy, as we saw with the example of EU interventions at UN fora. 
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SUMMARY
Mining the EU Global Strategy of 2016
This study proposes to apply an automated lexical analysis to the Eu-
ropean Security Strategy of 2003, entitled “A Secure Europe in a Bet-
ter World”, and the European Union Global Strategy of 2016, entitled 
“Shared Vision, Common Acton: A Stronger Europe”. The findings are 
not limited to supporting the predominant interpretations of scholars 
and experts, but aim at exploring the usefulness of text mining tech-
niques in the interpretation of EU documents. Furthermore, the conclu-
sions drawn from the lexical analysis are discussed in the light of com-
plex systems theory, which may be beneficial for the proper understand-
ing of the concept of resilience (mainly its multidimensional nature) 
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and its subsequent operationalization. The last part of the paper includes 
an in-depth analysis of the EU rhetoric on the UN fora (period: 2014–
2019) regarding the concept of resilience, in particular its linkages with 
human rights.
Keywords: European Union, United Nations, resilience, systems theory, 
human rights, text mining, security.
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